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Executive Agreements Relying on 
Implied Statutory Authority: A 
Response to Bodansky and Spiro 
 
 
David A. Wirth* 
 
  Until recently, the law surrounding executive agreements has 
been a subject of attention from a relatively small number of academics 
concerned with foreign relations law, along with State Department 
lawyers who have a need to deploy the underlying concepts in concrete 
determinations. Then, with little advance warning, the Paris 
Agreement thrust legal doctrines surrounding executive agreements to 
center stage in public policy debates and in the popular press. 
President Donald Trump’s campaign promise to “cancel” the Paris 
Agreement has drawn even more attention to the issue. 1 
Unfortunately, the result has been a great deal of confusion, often 
needlessly contributing to turbulent confrontations about the contours 
of the executive agreement power, when clarity and precision instead 
are called for. 
  Daniel Bodansky and Peter Spiro2 appropriately focus on a 
subset of executive agreements, namely those whose domestic legal 
authority is a federal statute that does not expressly authorize the 
executive branch to conclude international agreements.3 As they note, 
                                                                                                                       
 * Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, Newton, Massachusetts and 
Fulbright Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, National Research 
University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. This Response was supported 
by a generous grant from the Boston College Law School Fund. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the advice and assistance of Robert H. Abrams, Sherry Xin Chen, Robert 
L. Graham, Noah D. Hall, Lisa Heinzerling, Michael O’Loughlin, Annie Petsonk, and 
Joan Shear. The responsibility for all views expressed in this Response is nonetheless 
the author’s own. Portions of this Response are based on the author's previously 
published writings. 
 1. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan: 
More Fossil Fuels and Fewer Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/05/27/us/politics/donald-trump-global-warming-energy-policy.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/93RC-YLLL] (archived Feb. 1, 2017). 
 2. Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2016) [hereinafter Bodansky & Spiro]. 
 3. This Response uses the generic term “international agreement” to identify 
all instruments binding on the United States under international law. The term “treaty” 
is limited to those international agreements for which the Senate's advice and consent 
to ratification is necessary or has been given under U.S. Constitution Article II, Section 
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §§ 301, 303 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The defining feature of an international 
agreement binding under international law is an intent by the parties to be bound by its 
terms. See id. § 301; 22 C.F.R. § 181 (2014) (State Department regulations establishing 
standards for identifying international agreements). This attribute is characteristic of 
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the Paris Agreement is not the first international agreement to be 
concluded by the United States in this mode.4 Also as observed in their 
Article, this is an approach that has been deployed in the past by the 
executive branch with respect to a number of international 
environmental agreements, especially those addressing air pollution.5 
The tone and approach of their Article, unfortunately, risks 
exacerbating the already fraught, inflammatory, and combative 
rhetoric surrounding the conclusion of the Paris Agreement and other 
instruments done as executive agreements based on this theory. 6 
While the authors are more than entitled to share subjective 
impressions of their individual journeys through the law of executive 
agreements, the Article makes categorical assertions about the Obama 
administration’s approach to executive agreements that can be tested 
against prior practice and jurisprudence. 
In particular, the Article characterizes the Obama 
administration’s practice concerning executive agreements supported, 
but not necessarily expressly authorized, by extant legislation as  
 “the first to self-consciously deploy the concept”;7 
 “broadly aggressive” in considering legislative authority as domestic 
legal support for executive agreements;8 
 “the first to distinguish . . . executive agreements” supported by 
legislative authority not specifically authorizing international 
agreements;9  
 “a . . . choice . . . to roll out a new theory” of executive agreements 
consistent with existing legislative authority;10 
                                                                                                                       
both executive agreements and Article II, Section 2 treaties subject to Senate advice and 
consent to ratification. Both are “treaties” governed by international law, including in 
particular the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 4. Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 2, at 929. 
 5. Id. at 910–11. 
 6.  See, e.g., Inhofe Statement (R-Okla.) on Final COP 21 Climate Deal (Dec. 12, 
2015), http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases-republican?ID=59BD
6386-E65-4A22-81BE-352770A6FFC [https://perma.cc/2U7X-VQ9T] (archived Feb. 1, 
2017); Examining the International Climate Negotiations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
On Environment and Public Works, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 18, 2015) (Testimony of 
Julian Ku); Michael Ramsey, Is the Paris Climate Change Agreement Constitutional? 
(Part 2) ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 4, 2017), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-
originalism-blog/2016/03/is-the-paris-climate-change-agreement-constitutional-part-
2michael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/BQ9F-W2AU] (archived Feb. 1, 2017). 
 7. See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 2, at 887; see also Bodansky & Spiro, supra 
note 2, at 908. 
 8. Id. at 888.  
 9. Id. at 898.  
 10. Id. at 909.  
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 “a conscious effort to break out of existing categories” for executive 
agreements;11 and 
 “mov[ing] to eliminate [prior] substantive limitations” on executive 
agreements.12 
That the Article “christens”13
 
this category of instruments with 
the moniker “executive agreements plus,” 14  supposedly “heretofore 
undiscovered” 15  and a “new practice,” 16  further exacerbates the 
misleading nature of the Article’s conclusions and the needlessly 
tendentious tone of the piece. Indeed, the claims of innovative 
practice—and the accompanying implications of executive overreach—
are belied by the authors’ own analysis, which, in its broad outlines, is 
well taken.  
More plausible—although less dramatic—assertions might be 
made that the Obama administration has utilized this category of 
executive agreements more frequently than its predecessors, or in 
more politically contentious contexts. But the authors’ analysis is not 
aimed at supporting either of these conclusions. In any event, stripped 
of the dubious claims of novelty and the questionable insinuations of 
executive overreach, the authors have performed a useful service in 
drawing attention to a distinct class of executive agreements which, as 
they somewhat confusingly assert, “have a pedigree in prior 
practice.”17 
The lodestone for post-war discussions of the question of 
“choice of instrument”—that is, the executive’s decision-making 
juncture between an Article II, Section 2 treaty, subject to Senate 
advice and consent, as contrasted with an executive agreement relying 
exclusively on executive branch action as a precondition to entry into 
force—is Department of State Circular No. 175 (Circular 175), 
promulgated on December 13, 1955.18 One purpose of that instrument 
is “to . . . insure that the function of making treaties and other 
international agreements is carried out within traditional 
constitutional limits.”19 
                                                                                                                       
 11. Id. at 914. 
 12. Id. at 929.  
 13. Id. at 885. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 887. 
 16. Id. at 888.  
 17. Id. at 915. 
 18. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, CIRCULAR NO. 175 (1955) reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 784 (1956) [hereinafter Circular 175].  
 19. Id. § 1 (emphasis added). Similar regulations implement the Case-Zablocki 
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b, and can be found at 22 C.F.R. § 181. 
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As to the crucial treaty versus executive agreement choice, 
under the heading “Scope of the Executive Agreement-Making Power,” 
Circular 175 specifically identifies “[a]greements which are made 
pursuant to or in accordance with existing legislation,” directly 
addressing precisely the subject matter of Bodansky and Spiro’s Article 
more than half a century earlier.20 The original Circular 175 has since 
been reproduced and updated in the State Department’s Foreign 
Affairs manual, with the current version dating from 2006. That 
version continues to identify “legislation” as providing legal support for 
an international agreement other than a treaty—that is, an executive 
agreement.21 
It goes without saying that all international agreements of the 
United States must be consistent with the Constitution.22 In the case 
of an Article II, Section 2 treaty, the Senate’s resolution of advice and 
consent provides the necessary domestic legal authority.23 Consequently, 
the legal authority for the president to enter into a binding executive 
agreement must be found elsewhere, other than in the Senate’s 
resolution of advice and consent. Existing legislation, prior Article II, 
Section 2 treaties, and the president’s own Plenary Powers, are 
alternative sources of such authority.24 Of necessity, every provision of 
                                                                                                                       
 20. Circular 175, supra note 18, § 3.  
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL (F.A.M.) § 723.2-2 
(2006) [hereinafter Foreign Affairs Manual], https://fam.state.gov/fam/11fam/11fam0720 
.html [https://perma.cc/9KPH-LJTH] (archived Feb. 15, 2017) provides as follows: 
International agreements brought into force with respect to the United States on 
a constitutional basis other than with the advice and consent of the Senate are 
“international agreements other than treaties.” (The term “sole executive 
agreement” is appropriately reserved for agreements made solely on the basis of 
the constitutional authority of the President.) There are three constitutional 
bases for international agreements other than treaties as set forth below. An 
international agreement may be concluded pursuant to one or more of these 
constitutional bases: 
 (1) Treaty; 
 (2) Legislation; 
 (3) Constitutional authority of the President.  
See also id. § 723.2-2(B) (entitled “Agreements Pursuant to Legislation”): 
The President may conclude an international agreement on the basis of existing 
legislation, or subject to legislation to be adopted by the Congress, or upon the 
failure of Congress to adopt a disapproving joint or concurrent resolution within 
designated time periods. 
 Both the Article and this Response concern strictly the first of these two categories, 
with executive agreements adopted “upon the failure of Congress to adopt a disapproving 
joint or concurrent resolution within designated time periods” being extraordinarily rare, 
if not entirely unknown. 
 22. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §302 cmt. b. 
 23. See id. §303 cmt. d. 
 24. See id. 
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an international agreement done as an executive agreement must be 
supported by one of these authorities.25 The converse, however, is not 
the case. That is, different provisions of an executive agreement may 
find support in diverse legal sources, in some cases more than one. 
Circular 175 also contains procedural provisions requiring 
written approval from the State Department before the 
commencement of negotiations, designed primarily to assure 
coordination among executive departments in anticipation of the 
conclusion of an international agreement.26 An important component 
of the process is a memorandum prepared by the State Department’s 
Office of the Legal Adviser, identifying the legal authority for the 
proposed agreement. Among other things, these memoranda of law 
analyze the conclusion of the proposed agreement as either an Article 
II, Section 2 treaty or an executive agreement, as the case may be, 
depending on the presence or absence of the relevant legal authority. 
The memorandum also identifies the potential need for additional 
statutory enactments required for domestic implementation.27 
This doctrinal background produces a ready-made template for 
analyzing the constitutionality of each provision of an executive 
agreement. The Paris Agreement is an excellent example because its 
                                                                                                                       
 25. See id. §302 cmt. a. 
 26. The Article repeatedly uses the word “join” in describing the process by which 
a state becomes party to an international instrument. This previously colloquial usage 
has now become sufficiently commonplace that it has even extended to some official 
instruments. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, U.S.-CHINA 
JOINT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2016), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/31/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-
climate-change [https://perma.cc/K77N-662M] (archived Feb. 2, 2017). The distinctions 
among signature ad referendum, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession, and entry 
into force are nonetheless worth maintaining, particularly in the case of multilateral 
agreements, as interim procedural junctures before a state becomes party to an 
international agreement and therefore legally bound by its terms. See Vienna 
Convention, supra note 3, arts. 11–16, 24. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998), is an 
excellent example of the need for such precision. Signed for the United States by Vice 
President Albert Gore toward the end of the Bill Clinton presidency and never submitted 
to the Senate for advice and consent, the Protocol nonetheless gave rise to questions 
about the legal obligations of the United States under it. See Vienna Convention, supra 
note 3, art. 18 (articulating an obligation not to defeat objects and purposes of signed 
agreement pending decision to refrain from ratification); EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41175 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED 
LEGAL QUESTIONS 10–15 (Apr. 12, 2010). A state may appropriately be said to “join” an 
international organization, after which it becomes a member of it, ordinarily after 
becoming a party to the organization’s constituent treaty.  
 27. Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 21, § 723.4(b). The Circular 175 process 
also provides for Congressional consultations in appropriate situations. See, e.g., id. §§ 
722(4), 723.4, 725.1(5). While perhaps desirable in many if not most situations, executive 
consultations with Congress are not a necessary component of the domestic legal 
authority underlying an executive agreement. 
746 vanderbilt journal of transnational law [vol. 50:741 
content overlaps with a variety of domestic legal authorities. In 
particular, the task is to identify the domestic legal authority for 
implementation of each of the obligations in an executive agreement 
by reference to one or more of the following: 
 Prior Article II, Section 2 treaties, for which the most likely source is 
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992 Framework Convention);28  
 The president’s plenary powers under Article II, for which the most 
likely sources are his or her role as chief executive,29 the president’s 
function as diplomat in chief for the Nation, including exclusive 
responsibility and authority for conducting the foreign affairs of the 
United States,30 and the responsibility to “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed”;31 and 
 Existing legislation, for which the most likely, although not only, 
source of implementing authority is the federal Clean Air Act.32  
Many of the binding obligations in the Paris Agreement are 
procedural in nature, requiring the reporting of emissions, 
documenting progress in implementation, accounting for emissions, 
and the like.33 And consulting with other states is a constitutional 
power of the president as chief executive, principal diplomat, and the 
“sole organ” of the nation in dealing with foreign governments.34 Even 
in the absence of express statutory or treaty authority, the president 
may engage in information exchange and cooperation with foreign 
governments in the environmental field, as demonstrated by numerous 
                                                                                                                       
 28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature June 4, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. See 138 Cong. Rec. 
33527 (Oct. 7, 1992) (resolution of advice and consent to Framework Convention). The 
operative portion of the Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, art. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. No. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, identifies that instrument as “enhancing the implementation 
of the [Framework] Convention.” An accompanying decision of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention describes the Agreement as adopted “under” the Convention. 
Report on the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Dec. 1/CP.21 at I, 
para. 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) (adoption of the Paris 
Agreement).  
 29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 30. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) 
(President is “sole organ of the nation in its external relations”). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
 32. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2012). See also U.S. FIRST 
NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION SUBMISSION (2016), http://www4.unfccc.int/ 
ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A
.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7P2-2JGA] (archived Feb. 3, 
2017) (identifying domestic legal authorities supporting U.S. nationally determined 
emissions reduction contribution under Paris Agreement). 
 33. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 
REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142, 149–51 (2016) (collecting procedural provisions 
in Paris Agreement).  
 34. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304. 
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authorities, including a 1980 executive agreement with Canada on acid 
rain,35 which was concluded before the Clean Air Act was amended 
specifically to address this problem.36 
Similarly, the 1992 Framework Convention, concluded as an 
Article II, Section 2 treaty, specifically articulates an analogously 
extensive range of procedural obligations, including emissions 
reporting, exchange of information, technology transfer, and 
cooperation in implementation. 37  The 1992 Framework Convention 
also lays a legal foundation for substantive matters addressed in a 
binding mode in the Paris Agreement, most notably financial support 
for developing countries’ programs of mitigation (emissions reductions) 
and adaptation.38 Domestic statutory authority, such as the Clean Air 
Act, 39  buttresses the United States’ capacity to implement these 
commitments. 
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (Restatement) appears to be a primary source of 
uncertainty concerning the appropriateness of prior congressional 
legislation as domestic legal authority for an international agreement 
concluded by the president without express congressional 
authorization. 40  Section 303 of the Restatement identifies three 
categories of executive agreement: (1) those concluded by the president 
“with the authorization or approval of Congress”; (2) those concluded 
pursuant to an existing Article II, Section 2 treaty; and (3) those done 
“on his own authority . . . dealing with any matter that falls within his 
independent powers under the Constitution.”41 There is no specific 
mention in the text of Section 303 of the category of executive 
agreements addressed by Bodansky and Spiro, namely those consistent 
with, but not expressly authorized by, existing legislation. Comment e 
refers to “Congressional-Executive agreements,” which rely for their 
                                                                                                                       
 35. Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, U.S.-
Can., Aug. 5, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 9856, 32 U.S.T. 2521. 
 36. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 
2399, 2584–634 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651(o) (2012)) (acid deposition). 
 37. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 28, art. 4, paras. 1(a)–(b), 2(b) (reporting); art. 
4, para. 1(h), art. 5, para. b, art. 6, para. b(i), art. 7, para. 2(b) (exchange of information); 
art. 4, paras. 1(c),) 3, 5 & 8 (technology transfer); art. 4, para. 2(a) & (d) (joint 
implementation). 
 38. See, e.g., id. art. 4, paras. 3–4, 7, 11.  
 39. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2012). 
 40. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 303. 
 41. Id. Publicly available drafts and other information concerning the Fourth 
Restatement, currently in preparation, does not specifically address executive 
agreements, as distinct from Article II, Section 2 treaties. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2017), 
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/foreign-relations-law-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/ 
C2JK-AC7H] (archived Feb. 3, 2017). 
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legal authority on legislation that “requires, or fairly implies, the need 
for an agreement to execute the legislation.”42 
Of course, neither Circular 175—a unilateral action of the 
executive branch—nor the Restatement are themselves the law, but 
the Supreme Court has opined directly on the subject, most notably in 
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y.43 Despite its central 
importance to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on executive 
agreements, not to mention its environmental and regulatory subject 
matter, this case is notably absent from Bodansky and Spiro’s Article. 
In that case, the Supreme Court expressly concluded that it 
had the authority to interpret an executive agreement related to the 
subject matter of a regulatory statute but not expressly authorized by 
the legislation, thereby necessarily accepting the executive’s capacity 
to conclude the executive agreement in the first place.44 The Court, 
moreover, gave dispositive effect to the executive agreement as 
juxtaposed with statutory provisions asserted to be in direct conflict 
with the agreement. Japan Whaling is consequently powerful 
authority not only for the president’s capacity to conclude executive 
agreements related to congressionally articulated policy mandates, but 
also for the courts’ capacity to review the legal adequacy of such 
executive agreements by reference to the underlying statutory 
directives.45  
Executive agreements consistent with existing legislation of 
the variety encountered in Japan Whaling are entirely distinct from 
what are ordinarily known as “sole” executive agreements. As 
suggested by the title, sole executive agreements are typically 
understood to be those that rely exclusively on the president’s inherent 
constitutional powers, without support in either prior treaty or statute. 
                                                                                                                       
 42. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 303 cmt. e (observing, in addition, that 
“most” executive agreements fall into the category of Congressional-Executive 
agreements). 
 43. 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
 44. Id. at 230. But cf. David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying 
International Law and American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 395 (1992) 
(criticizing Japan Whaling for “contort[ing]” issue of statutory interpretation to 
harmonize executive agreement with legislative authority). 
 45. The logical corollary to these principles is that the courts have the capacity 
to adjudicate the applicability of the domestic legal authority asserted to support an 
executive agreement, and to conclude that that authority is lacking or that an agreement 
conflicts with existing legislative authority. Although implied by Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, there are no cases in the Court that expressly reach this conclusion. The 
power to conclude that an executive agreement lacks domestic legal authority has been 
sparingly employed by the lower courts as well, but there have been a number of cases 
reaching the conclusion that an executive agreement conflicts with legislation adopted 
by Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 
1953) (holding an executive agreement dealing with trade lacked legal authority due to 
express conflict with statute), aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); Swearingen v. 
United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Colo. 1983) (finding an executive agreement 
on double taxation lacked legal authority in “amending internal revenue laws by 
arrangements with foreign governments”). 
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Historically, sole executive agreements have attracted a great deal of 
attention because of the potentially unrestricted reach of the power 
and questions concerning Congress’s authority to regulate it.46  
The current version of the Circular 175 process explicitly 
clarifies that “[t]he term ‘sole executive agreement’ is appropriately 
reserved for agreements made solely on the basis of the constitutional 
authority of the President.”47  It further directs that sole executive 
agreements may be concluded only “so long as the agreement is not 
inconsistent with legislation enacted by the Congress in the exercise of 
its constitutional authority.”48 Consequently, provisions of executive 
agreements that overlap with existing statutory authority or treaty 
authority, as many provisions of the Paris Agreement do, would not 
presumptively be based on the president’s authority to conclude sole 
agreements.49 
The root of the problem identified by Bodansky and Spiro 
concerns the range of executive agreements that are supported by 
congressional legislation and identified in the Restatement as 
“Congressional-Executive agreements.” 50  The range of such 
instruments is enormous and includes the following: 
 Those authorized by prior congressional legislation and which do not 
enter into force until the adoption of subsequent implementing 
legislation (the form in which free trade agreements have been 
concluded by the United States since 1974);51 
 Those concluded by the executive as a consequence of an express 
legislative authorization or instruction;52  
                                                                                                                       
 46. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 303 cmts. h–j, n. 11–12 (discussing 
the history of executive agreements). 
 47. See Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 21, § 723.2-2 (emphasis added).  
 48. See id. § 723.2-2(C). 
 49. Presumably because of their potentially poorly defined limits and their 
source directly in the Constitution, along with the commensurately larger potential for 
abuse, “sole” executive agreements historically have been a source of great concern in 
authorities such as the Restatement. By contrast, those whose legal authority is either 
legislation or a prior Article II, Section 2 treaty can, additionally, be measured against 
those authorities to determine the acceptable limits of their scope. See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2. 
 50. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 303 cmt. e (“Congress may enact 
legislation that requires, or fairly implies, the need for an agreement to execute the 
legislation.”).  
 51. See id. § 303 reporters’ note 9; see also Made in the USA Found. v. United 
States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1323 (N.D. Ala. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 242 F.3d 
1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding constitutionality of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement as Congressional-Executive agreement). 
 52. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 303 reporters’ note 8 (noting the 
Congressional-Executive agreement as alternative to treaty). 
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 Those concluded as a logical consequence of a legislative delegation;53 
and 
 Those concluded as consistent with existing legislative authority, but 
neither expressly nor impliedly authorized by it (the subject of their 
Article). 
  Without defining or explicitly identifying the scope of 
congressional-executive agreements by reference to this typology, the 
Restatement nonetheless notes that “most” executive agreements have 
been concluded as congressional-executive agreements, at least 
implying that the power is broad.54 
  The traditional way of analyzing executive agreements, of 
which Bodansky and Spiro’s Article is an example, has been to attempt 
to pigeonhole a particular instrument as a sole or congressional-
executive agreement, or as authorized by an Article II, Section 2 treaty. 
Japan Whaling, by contrast, teaches that the relevant question is the 
presence or absence of legal authority supporting the agreement, 
recognizing that, for a complicated instrument such as the Paris 
Agreement, there may be multiple authorities and that the legal 
support for each of the international obligations must be identified 
individually.55 That case also establishes that the executive agreement 
power extends to and includes all of these four circumstances, 
including the last—agreements that are consistent with existing 
legislation but not expressly authorized by it.56  
Japan Whaling further demonstrates that the identification of 
the underlying legal authority is the beginning, not the end of the 
inquiry.57 The content of an agreement—or, more accurately, each of 
its provisions—must then be measured against the scope and limits of 
                                                                                                                       
 53. For example, section 157 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7457, formerly 
provided the Environmental Protection Agency with express legal authority to regulate 
chemicals contributing to the global problem of stratospheric ozone depletion, and was 
the legal authority under which the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer was negotiated. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489 
(proposed Dec. 14, 1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposing regulation for 
implementing Montreal Protocol under former section 157 of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7457). In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, section 157 was repealed and replaced 
with a new and considerably more detailed statutory directive tracking the Montreal 
Protocol, which now provides the statutory authority for that instrument. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7671–7671(q). 
 54. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 303, reporters’ note 8 (“As of June 1, 1983, 
the United States was a party to 906 treaties and 6571 executive agreements, most of 
them Congressional-Executive agreements.”). From 1939 through 2013 the United 
States concluded about 17,300 executive agreements, by contrast with approximately 
1,100 treaties in the constitutional sense. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 
5 (2015).  
 55. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 221. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
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the underlying authority. The rather obsessive preoccupation with 
slotting executive agreements into one or another category in a binary, 
blinkered, “yes/no” effort has all too frequently been an unfortunate 
distraction from the often far more nuanced and painstaking 
comparison required between each provision of an executive agreement 
and the scope of the underlying domestic authority. 
There is consequently a need for practitioners and scholars to 
match the provisions of executive agreements with corresponding and 
sometimes complicated domestic regulatory subject matter. 58 
Bodansky and Spiro acknowledge as much in their discussion of the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury (Minamata Convention), a major 
multilateral environmental instrument concluded by the Obama 
administration as an executive agreement.59 The authors lament that 
“the State Department did not specify the legal basis for concluding the 
agreement.”60 
While greater transparency as to the underlying legal 
authority would be very much welcome, this situation is unfortunately 
the norm, as the Circular 175 process is not ordinarily public and the 
associated documentation is not infrequently classified. 61  That, 
however, does not mean that the underlying legal authority does not 
exist, or that the president lacks the authority to conclude the 
agreement. In the case of the Paris Agreement, moreover, the United 
States expressly disclosed the domestic regulatory authorities on 
which it relies for implementation of its pledge in its submission to the 
UN-sponsored process accompanying the conclusion of the 
instrument. 62  For the Minamata Convention, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has publicly released an analysis relating the 
Convention’s requirements to domestic regulatory authorities.63  
                                                                                                                       
 58. This is the sort of inquiry anticipated in principle by such efforts as Oona A. 
Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in 
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008). See also Ryan Harrington, Understanding 
the “Other” International Agreements, 108 L. LIBR. J. 343 (2016).  
 59. Minamata Convention on Mercury, Oct. 10, 2013, (not in force) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/10/20131010%2011-16%20AM/CTC-XXVII-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EX8P-ANLD] (archived Feb. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Minamata 
Convention]. 
 60. Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 2, at 910–11. 
 61. A useful suggestion in this regard might be a voluntary modification of 
executive branch practice under the Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b, in effect a 
reporting statute requiring Congressional notification of concluded agreements 
 62. U.S. FIRST NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION SUBMISSION, supra 
note 32. 
 63. See Minamata Convention, supra note 59; see also What EPA is Doing to 
Reduce Mercury Pollution, and Exposures to Mercury, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/mercury/what-epa-doing-reduce-mercury-pollution-and-exposures-
mercury [https://perma.cc/2X9M-UK8K] (archived Feb. 6, 2017). 
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Even in the absence of express identification of supporting 
domestic legal authorities, this task readily yields to the deployment of 
straightforward research skills routinely taught to law students in the 
United States. As one might expect from a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme designed to address environmental and public health threats 
from this highly toxic element, the Minamata Convention governs 
emissions to the air,64 releases to soil and water,65 management of 
mercury-containing wastes,66 contaminated sites,67 trade in mercury 
and its alloys,68 and regulation of mercury-containing products and 
processes in which it is employed.69 Most obviously, specific domestic 
statutory enactments address mercury directly. The Mercury Export 
Ban Act prohibits exports of elemental mercury from the United 
States, 70  and the Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery 
Management Act phases out the use of mercury in batteries and 
provides for the efficient and cost-effective disposal of nickel-cadmium 
and other batteries.71 
Regulations adopted under the delegated authority of under 
familiar domestic environmental authorities track other portions of the 
Convention. The Clean Air Act’s provision dealing with toxic air 
pollutants 72  identifies mercury by name and contains an express 
mandate to the EPA to address mercury from power plants.73 Notably, 
although the EPA’s major rules with respect to mercury from power 
plants were successfully challenged in the Supreme Court,74 there was 
no noticeable impact of that case on the capacity of the United States 
to implement the Minamata Convention. The EPA has adopted rules75 
                                                                                                                       
 64. Minamata Convention, supra note 59, art. 8. 
 65. Id. art. 9. 
 66. Id. arts. 10, 11. 
 67. Id. art. 12. 
 68. Id. arts. 3. 
 69. Id. arts. 4, 5. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 2611 (2011). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14301–14336 (2002). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2010) (air toxics). 
 73. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and 
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial Institutional, and Small 
Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9303 (Feb. 
16, 2012). 
 74. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). After the Supreme Court’s decision, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the 
rule could remain in place while EPA answered the Court’s objections to it, and 
remanded the rule to EPA. White Stallion Energy Center L.L.C. v. EPA, No. 12-1100, 
2015 WL 11051103 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Michigan v. EPA., 
136 S. Ct. 2463 (2016). 
 75. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Dental Category (Dec. 
15, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/dental-office-
category_final_prepub_12-15-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM7A-UAZM] (archived Apr. 
11, 2017). See Dental Effluent Guidelines Documents, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
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on discharges of mercury from dental offices into municipal sewage 
treatment plants under the Clean Water Act.76 These regulations were 
adopted in final form by the Obama administration, but were 
subsequently “frozen” by one of President Trump’s first actions as 
President.77 That action, however, does not of itself call into question 
the Agency’s capacity to adopt these rules,78 which is the relevant 
inquiry for determining the existence of statutory authority in support 
of an executive agreement relying on this power. 
Applying this same rubric to the Paris Agreement, there is no 
evidence of executive overreach. To the contrary, even the most cursory 
review of the text of the Paris Agreement discloses a careful, purposeful 
alternation between the mandatory “shall”—indicating a binding 
obligation in the form of an executive agreement, governed by 
international law—and the hortatory “should”—non-binding 
statements of strictly political intent without legal force.79 Indeed, the 
U.S. delegation held up the final moments of the conference that 
adopted the Paris Agreement over the should/shall distinction in an 
important provision of the agreement addressing the need for 
developed-country parties to undertake increasingly ambitious 
emissions reductions goals over time. 80  If anything, the executive 
branch may have been excessively cautious in interpreting its legal 
                                                                                                                       
https://www.epa.gov/eg/dental-effluent-guidelines-documents (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/G4PS-EYV4] (archived Apr. 11, 2017). 
 76. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2011). Mercury is specifically referenced in the 
Toxic Pollutant List in section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1) 
(toxic water pollutants). See 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (2016) (“mercury and compounds”). For 
example, the EPA has promulgated effluent limitations governing releases of mercury to 
surface waters for any number of categories of point sources under the statute, including 
manufacturing facilities for zinc anode batteries (40 C.F.R. §§ 461.71 & .72); ore mines 
and mills (40 C.F.R. §§ 440.42 & .43); commercial hazardous waste combustors (40 C.F.R. 
§§ 444.13 & .15); facilities producing chlorine and sodium or potassium hydroxide (40 
C.F.R. §§ 415.62 & .63); tanker trucks and containers transporting chemical or 
petroleum cargoes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 442.11 & .13); and barges and tankers transporting 
chemical or petroleum cargos (40 C.F.R. §§ 442.31 & .33). 
 77. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies; 
Regulatory Freeze Pending Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 8436 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
 78. The legality of this action has been challenged. See Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NRDC v. EPA, No. 17-cv-751 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/NRDC%20complaint.pdf, [https://perma.cc/PKL8-VV9H] 
(archived Apr. 11, 2017). 
 79. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 33. Non-binding undertakings in principle 
are not international agreements, and hence are not subject to Senate advice and 
consent. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty Power, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 188 (1998). 
 80. See David A. Wirth, Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden 
Code: United States Law and the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIMATE L. 152, 153 (2016). 
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authority by declining to accept binding substantive emissions goals as 
part of the Paris Agreement.81 
If this sounds like the stuff of domestic regulation and 
administrative law, that is because it is. Executive agreements such as 
the Minamata Convention are frequently the interface between 
municipal regulatory regimes on the one hand and the high politics of 
international lawmaking on the other. At least in the United States, 
traversing these divides requires that international lawyers become 
skilled in the language of delegation, rulemaking, and administrative 
law, and symmetrically requires regulatory lawyers to master the 
complexities of international lawmaking and multilateral agreements. 
To that extent, the Minamata Convention and the Paris Agreement are 
harbingers of the future of both administrative and international law, 
suggesting the need for a significant amplification of the skill set 
required in both areas, not only from the lawyers of the future but also 
of the present.82 
Purple prose aside, Bodansky and Spiro have performed a 
service in drawing attention to executive agreements concluded under 
or in accordance with the president’s constitutional power and 
consistent with, but not expressly authorized by, domestic regulatory 
authority. Leaving aside the question whether the Obama 
administration has demonstrated a preference for such executive 
agreements in an era of divided government, as a matter of principle 
the phenomenon they purport to “christen” as “executive agreements 
plus” enjoys a long and solid history in both practice and jurisprudence. 
And, perhaps more to the point, the legality of this category of 
executive agreement can be tested by measuring the international 
agreement against the underlying domestic legal authorities. Perhaps 
the most important message from this exchange would be a plea to the 
reporters for the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States expressly to identify this sub-category of executive 
agreements and to describe their appropriate scope, breadth, and 
limits, consistent with existing jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                       
 81. See David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: 
A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 515 (2015) (analyzing president’s authority to adopt binding emissions reduction 
obligations in Paris Agreement as executive agreement). 
 82. The debate over the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA) discussed in 
the Article has a similar shape, with the Executive Branch citing existing statutory 
authority in response to criticism of the anticipated conclusion of the instrument as an 
executive agreement. Compare Jack Goldsmith, The Doubtful Constitutionality of ACTA 
as an Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreement, LAWFARE (May 21, 2012), https:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/doubtful-constitutionality-acta-ex-ante-congressional-executive-
agreement [https://perma.cc/J4XN-CUCM] (archived Feb. 6, 2017) with Letter from 
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Hon. Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) 
(Mar.  6,  2012),   http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State
-Department-Response-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6UZ-2PD9] (archived 
Feb. 6, 2017). 
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In short, the president has the power to enter into agreements 
that are consistent with, but not necessarily expressly authorized by, 
prior statute, that authority was recognized by the Supreme Court at 
the latest three decades ago, and exercise of that prerogative has a 
lengthy history in executive branch practice. Regardless of the extent 
to which the Obama administration has or has not utilized this 
category of executive agreements, there is little or no basis either in 
history or law to suggest that the practice is somehow different in kind 
from that which preceded it. Whether this is desirable as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine is a subject of legitimate debate. But, to suggest 
that the Obama administration’s application of well-received 
principles is new and questionable, and that it lacks discernible 
standards and limits, distracts from rather than enhances the 
intellectual integrity of that discussion. 
That said, the reason that Bodansky, Spiro, practitioners, 
scholars, and the author of the present Response focus so attentively 
on executive agreements is the structural potential for abuse, given the 
unilateral and largely unchecked nature of the power. As Bodansky 
and Spiro correctly observe, presidents have obvious incentives to 
stretch the limits of the executive agreement power. Although the view 
that previous executives have been cautious and sparing in the exercise 
of the executive agreement authority may be contested, the need for 
continued vigilance is a proposition as to which there should be a 
consensus. Fortunately, the same legal tests that allowed the Obama 
administration constitutionally to adopt the Minamata Convention, 
the Paris Agreement, and other instruments as executive agreements 
have concomitantly clear outer limits that, at least in principle, protect 
against executive overreach in situations in which there is greater 
cause for doubt. 
